Polish Audit Finds Territorial Defence Readiness Gaps but Credits Flood Response

Poland’s Supreme Audit Office has identified shortcomings in the preparation, equipment management and oversight of the country’s Territorial Defence Forces (WOT), while separately giving a positive assessment of their peacetime emergency response. Its public report, issued on 28 October 2026, does not establish that the force as a whole failed to perform its duties: much of the detailed military assessment remains classified.

The audit, designated P/25/024, reviewed WOT headquarters and four territorial brigades during 2023–2025. Inspectors examined the planning of force development, unit structures, military equipment, storage and maintenance, rotational training and preparedness for crises. The Supreme Audit Office, known in Polish as NIK, reported multiple irregularities in preparation and functioning, but commended WOT’s work in civilian crisis management.

NIK cited Operation Feniks, Poland’s response to the 2024 floods, which involved more than 15,000 territorial soldiers. That positive finding is material: the published record does not support treating every identified administrative or readiness deficiency as evidence of a failed disaster response.

The auditor recommended verifying the consistency and currency of operational documents, testing actual capabilities of individual units, revisiting development plans against geographic security risks, and improving monitoring and supervision. It also urged an expedited transfer of WOT to the command of the chief of Poland’s General Staff. This is a recommendation, not confirmation that the transfer has taken place.

The public NIK statement records remedial measures described by the Ministry of National Defence. These include work on a monitoring and evaluation tool, an updated WOT development plan for 2025–2039, adjustments to equipment planning and a review of training programmes. Their existence is not the same as independently verified completion or effectiveness.

A separate ministry statement from 25 September described WOT as having more than 45,000 soldiers, with at least one brigade in each province, and stressed the force’s role in supporting local communities, border security and defence. That account provides the ministry’s stated purpose and scale of the organisation. It does not address each specific audit deficiency, and no later item-by-item ministry response was independently established for this report.

NIK explicitly said the public summary omits many detailed findings for national-security reasons. Post-audit communications to brigade commanders carry a restricted classification; those directed to WOT headquarters and the defence minister, as well as the full findings report, are secret. The open record therefore does not allow an independent unit-by-unit comparison of readiness or a conclusion that every recommendation has been implemented. It also contains no finding of criminal fraud.

The next public-accountability questions are whether the command structure changes, what measurable improvements follow the training and equipment reviews, and whether parliamentary oversight or subsequent audit releases can document implementation. For now, the record establishes both acknowledged management weaknesses and effective flood-response mobilisation, not a one-sided verdict on the force.